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SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC,' SS.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
STATE OF MAINE, ex rel. RICHARD S.
COHEN, Attorney General, in his
official capacity and on behalf of
DAVID LEE BARTLETT and ROLAND P.
COLLINS and all Maine Consumers
similarly situated,

*
*
*
*

Plaintiff
*
*

v.

Civil Action
Doc.No. CV-79-415

*

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
A Delaware Corporation,

*
*

Defendant
*

*******************
STATE OF MAINE, ex rel.RICHARD S.
COHEN, Attorney General, in his
official capacity,

*

Plaintiff

*
*
*

Civil Action
Doc.No. CV-79-737

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
*

Defendant
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
REQUEST FOR HEARING ON MOTION
We request the clerk to schedule the Motion Requesting the
Court to Report the Case to the Law Court Pursuant to Rule 72(c)
of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure for January 29, 1981 at
3:00 P.M

The matter to be heard is non-testimonial.
To the nearest one-quarter hour, our good faith estimate of
the time which the hearing will take is one-quarter hour.

VERRILL & DANA
Two Canal Plaza
Portland, Maine
(207)774-4000

04112

Copy to:
John F. Dana, Esq.
Cheryl Harrington, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

STATE OP MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
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*
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STATE OP MAINE, ex rel. RICHARD S.
COHEN, Attorney General, in his
official capacity and on behalf of
DAVID LEE BARTLETT and ROLAND P
COLLINS and all Maine Consumers
similarly situated,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Plaintiff

*
*

Civil Action
Doc. No. CV-79-415

*
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FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,
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*

Defendant

*
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*

s t a t e o f Ma i n e ; ex rel. r i c h a r d s.
COHEN, Attorney General, in his
official capacity,

*
*
*
*

*

Plaintiff

*
*
*

Civil Action
Doc. No. CV-79-737

*

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

*
*

Defendant

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*

*

*

MOTION REQUESTING THE COURT TO REPORT THE
CASE TO THE LAW COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 72(c)
OF THE MAINE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
NOW COMES the Defendant, Ford Motor Company, by and
through its attorneys, and hereby moves this Court, pursuant
to Rule 72(c) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure for an
order and certificate reporting the above-captioned cases to
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the Law Court such that the Law Court may determine, before
any further proceedings are taken therein, the question of
whether Ford Motor Company's Motions to Dismiss should have
been granted as a matter of law, and for an order staying all
further proceedings in the above-captioned cases except as are
necessary to preserve the rights of the parties without making
any decision therein.

As grounds for this Motion, Defendant

Ford Motor Company states:
1.

The Court has made a ruling on interlocutory motions

of Ford Motor Company, and Ford Motor Company is an aggrieved
party concerning, and because of, such ruling?
2.

The interests of justice' and particularly, the just,

speedy and inexpensive determination of the above-captioned
cases will be served by a report of the Court's interlocutory
ruling to the Law Court, in that an arduous, expensive and
time-consuming discovery process and litigation could be
avoided by the Law Court's determination of the questions of
law involved in this Court's interlocutory order prior to any
further proceedings in the above-captioned cases;
3.

Determination by the Law Court of the questions of law

involved in the Court's interlocutory ruling would be of great
importance to both the parties and to other members of the
public in that questions, among others, concerning the court's
jurisdiction, matters of statutory construction, and the
standing of the Attorney General are involved in the Court1s
interlocutory order; and
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4.

The questions of law involved in the Court's order are

of significant doubt and involve questions of law novel to
Maine jurisprudence, and are questions of controlling
importance to the above-captioned cases.

Roberta. Keach, Esquire
VERRILL & DANA
Two Canal Plaza
Portland, Maine
(207) 774-4000

04112
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STA T E OF M A IN E
S U P lfiR IO F C O U R T
A U G U S T A , M A IN E 0 4 3 3 0
DANIEL E WATHLN
JUSTICE

December 2, 1980

Howard Dana., Jr., Esg.
Verrill & Dana
Two Canal Plaza
P.O. Box 586
Portland, ME 04112
Cheryl Harrington, Esg.
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
State Office Bldg.
Augu sta, ME 043 33
Re:

State of Maine v. Ford Motor Co.
79-415 and 79-737

Dear Ms. Harrington & Mr. Dana:
From the recent correspondence, I assume this case is
now in order for oral argument on the motion to dismiss.
I don't have much time in the month of December
but will ask the Clerk's office to schedule it on
the first civil motion day in January. If this is
unsatisfactory to either of you, please don't hesitate to
contact me.
Sincerely yours,

Daniel E. Wathen
Justice, Superior Court
DEW/mlg

SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
STATE OF MAINE, ex rel. RICHARD S.
COHEN, Attorney General, in his
official capacity and on behalf of
DAVID LEE BARTLETT and ROLAND P.
COLLINS and all Maine Consumers
similarly situated,
Plaintiff

Civil Action
Doc. No. CV-79-415

v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
STATE OF MAINE, ex rel. RICHARD S.
COHEN, Attorney General, in his
official Capacity,
Plaintiff
Civil Action
Doc. No. CV-79-737

v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN
WHICH TO PLEAD OR OTHERWISE DEFEND
NOW COMES the Defendant, Ford Motor Company, by and
through its attorneys, and hereby moves this Court, pursuant
to Rules 12(a) and 15(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Pro
cedure, for an order extending, until further order of this
Court, the time within which Ford Motor Company must plead or
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otherwise defend in response to the Amended Complaints for
Permanent Injunction, Restitution and Damages dated May 14,
1980 in the above-captioned matters.

As grounds for this

Motion, Defendant Ford Motor Company states:
1.

Ford Motor Company has filed with the Court, simul

taneously with this Motion for Extension of Time within Which
to Plead or Otherwise Defend, a Motion Requesting the Court to
Report the Case to the Law Court Pursuant to Rule 72(c) of the
Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court’s ruling on that
Motion may make it unnecessary for Ford Motor Company to
answer or otherwise defend against the amended complaints at
this time; and
2.

Even if this Court fails to grant Ford Motor Company's

Motion pursuant to Rule 72(c), in view of the complexity and
length of the Amended Complaints for Permanent Injunction,
Restitution and Damages dated May 14, 1980, the complexity of
the issues in the above-captioned matters, and in view of the
time required to amass necessary factual data, said extension
is necessary to adequately prepare a response to said amended
complaints.

Respectfully Submitted,
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
Bv Its Attorneys

David C. Hillman, Esquire
-2-

\
-r"

y

l

Robert. J. #eac , Esquire
VERRILL & DANA
Two Canal Plaza
Portland, Maine
(207) 774-4000

04112
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT
FORD MOTOR COMPANY'S MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE
72(c) OF THE MAINE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On or about May 14, 1980, the Attorney General filed
Amended Complaints in the above-captioned matters alleging
that Ford Motor Company had committed a litany of breaches of
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the implied warranty, unfair trade practices and common law
torts/

Ford Motor Company timely filed Motions to Dismiss the

Amended Complaints pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Maine Rules
of Civil Procedure on the grounds that, inter alia, this Court
was without subject matter jurisdiction over the Amended
Complaints, that the Attorney General lacked standing and/or
the authority to bring the Amended Complaints, and that the
Amended Complaints, as a matter of law, failed in all requests
to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

The parties

submitted evidence on the questions of jurisdiction and
standing, and the issues were briefed and argued before the
Court.
By its Decision and Order dated January 21 ] 1981, this
Court denied Ford Motor Company’s Motions to Dismiss.

This

Memorandum is filed in support of Ford Motor Company's Motion
pursuant to Rule 72(c) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure
requesting this Court to report this case to the Law Court,
and to stay all further proceedings in the captioned
proceedings.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REPORT THIS CASE TO THE LAW COURT
FOR DETERMINATION OF THE QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED IN
ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER BECAUSE THOSE QUESTIONS OF
LAW ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND SIGNIFICANT DOUBT AND
BECAUSE EXPENSIVE AND TIME-CONSUMING LITIGATION COULD
THEREBY BE AVOIDED.
Rule 72(c) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that if the Superior Court is of the opinion that questions of
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law involved in an interlocutory order or ruling made by the
Court 'should be determined by the Law Court before any further
proceedings in the case, "it may, on motion of the aggrieved
party, report the case to the Law Court for that purpose and
stay all further proceedings except such as are necessary to
preserve the rights of the parties without making any
decisions therein."

Me.R.Civ.P. 72(c) (1980).

.Based on

considerations of judicial economy and justice, the rule,
though not limited to such situations, is particularly
important where arduous, expensive and time-consuming litiga
tion could be avoided by a Law Court determination of the
questions of law involved in an interlocutory order.

As the

Law Court recently noted:
We are aware that interlocutory appeals under
Rule 72(c) can serve the cause of justice by
mitigating the harshness of the final judgment
rule and by sparing the parties arduous trial
litigation when important questions of law can
be determined by the Law Court.... Without
entering upon extended discussion of these
cases, we note that issues of substance, such as
standing of the parties, the construction of a
statute or the role of summary judgment, are
frequently the subject of interlocutory appeals
under Rule 72(c).
Laverdiere v. Marden, 333 A.2d 701, 702 (Me. 1975) (emphasis
supplied).

See generally, Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine

Civil Practice § 72.6 (Supp. 1977).
Thus this case is particularly appropriate for an order
reporting the case to the Law Court under Rule 72(c).

Without

limitation, the questions of law encompassed in the Court's
Decision and Order involve matters of statutory construction,
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of the Court's subject matter jurisidiction, and of the
Attorney General's standing and authority to maintain the
actions, as well as the question of whether, as a matter of
law, the Amended Complaints state claims upon which relief can
be granted.

Moreover, a long and expensive trial could be

avoided by the Law Court's determination of these questions of
law prior to any further proceedings in the case.

In fact,

the Law Court has often found interlocutory appeals under Rule
72(c) appropriate in the face of lower court denials of
motions to dismiss where the ruling below turned on a novel
question of law.

See, e.g., Davis v. Bath Iron Works Corp.,

338 A.2d 146 (Me. 1975); McNally v. Nicholson Manufacturing
Co., 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973); ThUt~v; 'Grant, 281 A.2d 1 (Me,
1971).

See also, Englebert v. Development Corp. for Evergreen

Valley, 361 A.2d 908 (Me. 1976) (order granting prejudgment
attachment); Churchill v. S.A.D. No. 49 Teacher's Ass'n, 380
A.2d 186 (Me. 1977) (motion for stay).
Assuming the court's willingness to report the case, the
prerequisites to a permissable unilateral report of an inter
locutory matter are straightforward.

The court must have

ruled conclusively on an interlocutory motion, and the party
aggrieved thereby must move for a Rule 72(c) report.
Churchill v. S.A.D. No. 49 Teacher's Ass'n, 380 A.2d 186, 189
(Me. 1977); Collett v. Bither, 262 A.2d 353 (Me. 1970).
Additionally, the questions need only be of "sufficient
importance and doubt", meaning the resolution of the questions
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has importance to the parties and public and the questions are
novel to Maine jurisprudence.

Toussaint v. Perreault, 388

A.2d 918 (Me. 1978).
The case before the Court is thus a classic example of an
instance in which Rule 72(c) is most judiciously utilized; all
of the requirements found in Rule 72(c) and judicially grafted
thereon are met.

The legal issues involved in the Court's

Decision and Order of January 21, 1981 are of great importance*
to Ford Motor Company, the Attorney General's Office, and the
public in general, and resolution of those issues by Maine's
highest Court remains in doubt.
supra.

Toussaint v. Perreault,

As this court said in its Decision and Order, the

Motions to Dismiss raise novel questions of law upon which
neither Maine case law nor legislative history shed light.
(Decision and Order, dated January 21, 1981, at p.6)

This

Court has conclusively ruled on the Motions to Dismiss, and
Ford Motor Company is aggrieved by that ruling.

See,

Churchill v. S.A.D. No. 49 Teachers Ass'n, supra.

Each

prerequisite to effective utilization of Rule 72(c), including
those grafted into the statute by Toussaint, are therefore
satisfied by the case at bar.
CONCLUSION
The questions of law involved in the Court's Decision and
Order of January 21, 1981 are of significant importance and
doubt, and determination of those questions by the Law Court
via the mechanism of a Rule 72(c) report could prevent an
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unnecessary and expensive discovery process and trial.
Considerations of justice and economy therefore make appro
priate an order of this Court reporting the case to the Law
Court and staying all further proceedings.

!9i
I** f '

Dated: //j ^

VERRILL & DANA
Two Canal Plaza
Portland, Maine
(207) 774-4000

Respectfully submitted,
FORD MOTOR COMPANY

04112

-6-

STATE OF M M ME
KENNEBEC, SS ■

SUEE .UIOE COURT
CIVIL ACTION
Docket Nos. CV79-4
CV79-7

STATE OF MAINE , ex rel.
RICHARD S. COHEN , Attorney
General, in his official
capacity and on behalf of
DAVID LEE BARTLETT and
ROLAND P, COLLINS and all
Maine Consumers similarly situated,
Plaintiffs
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
A Delaware Corporation,
Def endant

STATE OF MAINE, ex rel.
RICHARD S. COHEN, Attorney
General, in his official
capacity,
Plaintiff
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
- - Ï
' )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DECISION AND ORDER

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ford Motor Company (Ford) is a Delaware Corporation.
It derives substantially all of its gross revenue from sales
in interstate or international commerce.

Ford is principally

engaged in the business of manufacturing, assembling and selling

2vehicles, and related parts and accessories to a worId~wlde
market»
There are no Ford manufacturing plants located in this
State,,

Ford docs, however, sell vehicles and related parts

and accessories to independent Ford and Lincoln Mercury dea lers
in Maine, who in turn se11 to consumers.
In order to deal with potential problems associated
with their business, Ford has developed a system of
limited express warranties, extended service contract programs,
ex tended policy programs and good will adjustment programs.
These practices are organized and implemented uniformly to vehicles
nationally, regardless of where the vehicles were purchased and
regardless of the owner's state of citizenship or residence.
Ail decisions concerning these programs and Ford's obligations
in accordance with state law implied warranties are made by
Ford personnel at Ford's Dearborn, Michigan World Headquarters,
Allegedly, certain Ford vehicles developed problems
or were defectively manufactured.

These problems or defects

included "piston-scuff ing", "piston™slapping", excessive
camshaft and rocker arm wear, cracked engine blocks and other
unspecified malfunctioning conditions.

In addition, it is

claimed that certain Ford owner *s manuals specified an improper
engine lubricant for use in the vehicles.
On January 10, 1978, Complaint counsel for the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) commenced suit against Ford by filing an
administrative complaint entitled In the Matter of Ford Motor Co.,

-3™
FTC Docket No, 9105,

The FTC Complaint sought, inter alia,

to regulate Ford concerning its warranties, its extended policy
programs relating to piston-scuffing, camsha ft/rocker arm wear
and cracked blocks , and to compel Ford to compensate purchasers
of motor vehicles affected by these alleged defects.

On

January 15, 1900, a Consent Order, signed by FTC Complaint
Counsel and Ford was certified to the FTC Secretary.

After beino

placed in the public record for public comment, the Consent Order
was accepted by the FTC and made final.
The programs instituted by Ford, prior to and in accordance
with the Consent Order, for the purpose of correcting the problems
or defects, were applied and implemented on a national basis.
The Attorney General (AG) commenced these actions
(Docket Nos. 79-415 and 79-737) pursuant to Sections 2-314 and
2-316(5)(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the
Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA).

In essence the AG alleges

that Ford .vehicles were sold at retail in Maine as consumer
goods, and that Ford breached the implied warranty of
merchantability and f¿alied to compensate injured consumers in
accordance with Maine law.

The AG's allegations further state

that 11 M.R.S.A. §316(5) (a) makes these acts per se violations of
the UTPA,
Presently before this Court is Defendant Ford's motion to
dismiss.

Ford argues, inter a1ia, that these actions should be

dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Ford asserts that it is

exempt from prosecution under the UTPA.
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DISCUSS-TOM OF LAW
The Maine Legislature, in response to encouragement from
the F.T.C., and in an effort to eradicate widespread and
unfair deceptive trade practices, enacted the Maine version of
the ".Little F.T.C."

The Unfair Trade Practices Act [UTPA]

was enacted by P .L . 196 9 c . 67 7, § 1.

In its original form,

the re lief provided for, consisted of injunctive relief to
terminate the offending practice.

No provision was made for

the Attorney General to seek recovery on behalf of individuals,
nor was there any provision for a private right of action.
In this respect, the Maine 1aw was consistent with and co~
extensive with the federal legislation which has as its purpose,
curtailment of unfair competition, and under which no private
cause of action is created.

Fulton v. Hecht,

580 F,2d 1243

{C .A . Fla. 1978), cert, denied, 99 S.Ct. 1789.
The original Act was limited in dealing with interstate
corporations..

The exceptions are currently codified in

5 M.R.S.A. 5208(2) which provides, in relevant part, that the
Act shall not apply to:
Trade or commerce of any person of whose
gross revenue at least 20% is derived from
transactions in interstate commerce,
excepting however transactions and actions
which occur primarily and substantially
within the State, and as to which the ~
Federal Trade Commission or its designated
representative has failed to assert in
writing within 14 days of notice to it and
to said person by the Attorney General its
objection to action proposed by him and

aset forth in said notice; the burden of
proving exemption, under this subsection,
from this chapter shall be upon the person
claiming the exemption,
(emphasis supplied).
The Legislature subsequently amended the UTPA to create
private remedial rights.

P .L . 1971 c . 229 amended §209 to

provide the Court with authority to include in its judgments/
in actions brought by the AG, such orders as might be necessary
to restore financial loss to persons who are the victims
of unfair trade practices.

P .L . 1973 c , 251 enacted §2 13

and established a private right of' action and made provision
for the prevailing party to recover restitution and counsel
fees.

During this period in which the relief provisions were

expanded, §208(2) was not amended and remains in force and
effect to the present date in its original form.
Ford argues that they have met their burden of establishing
that more than 20% of their gross revenues are derived from
interstate commerce and that the transactions and actions
challenged in the present litigation did not occur primarily
and substantially within the State of Maine and, therefore,
under the provisions of §208, nothing in the UTPA applies to
Ford, and this Court is without jurisdiction.
The AG counters and contends that the transactions involved
in this litigation did indeed occur primarily and substantia 1ly
within the State of Maine and thus, this Court has jurisdiction
to entertain the action.

Much of the briefs supplied by the

respective parties relate to the issue of the interpretation
of the phrase "primarily and substantially".

This Court is
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not persuaded that: the "transactions and actions" involved in
this litigation took place primarily and substantially in Maine.
At oral argument, the Attorney General questioned whether
the jurisdictional excoptions croated undor §200 app1ied 1n any
way to an action brought by the Attorney General seeking private
recovery under either- §209 or 92 13 . The basic issue as to
whether the exceptions relate to private remedial provisions
must be addressed„

A novel question is presented and no

legislative history exists to guide the Court.
It seems apparent that the intent of §208(2) was to
preserve both state and federal enforcement interests and to
avoid possible conflicts in the exercise of federal and state
jurisdiction.

Se_e:

Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and

the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems,
Rev.

48 B.U. Law

559, 609 n. 190 (1980).
In Rai-~i:ner v . Carter, Me., 405 A. 2d 19 4 (197 9) , our Law

Court had occasion to consider an unrelated issue arising under
the UTPA and recognized that in the areas in which there existed
no analogue in the federal law, the Maine law required interpretatier
unaided by federal precedent.

The Court in thf.it decision

acknowledged that the FTC is designed "primarily to protect
the public, not to punish wrongdoers or to afford direct remedies
to private citizens.

Its primary purpose is to afford a

preventive remedy, not a compensatory one.”

Thus, the issue

presented in the present case is whether the exceptions which
appear to have been enacted to preserve and protect the federal
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analogue, should be applied to defeat the private remedial
provisions which have no analogue under the federal law.
If one were to conclude that the exceptions set forth
in §200 were to apply to private remedial provisions, the
situation couId arise where one consumer who purchased
property from an intrastate manufacturer would be entitled to
recover full restitution and attorneys fees under the UTPA and
another consumer who purchased similar property with similar
defects from an out-of-state manufacturer would be entitled to
recover only the difference between goods as presented and
represented.

Such an unequal result is neither mandated nor

suggested by the application of controlling principles of law.
Another demonstration of the fact that §2OB is not
appropriate in dealing with private remedial actions can be
hypothesized as follows.

If a private remedial action were

brought and it was determined that the manufacturer derived
more than 20% of his gross income from interstate
commerce but the transaction did not occur primarily and
substantially in the State of Maine, §200(2} would, if applicable,
permit the FTC to preempt the private remedial action by
asserting its objection to that action,

Clearly, given the

role that has been assigned the FTC, it does not require that
authority.

It must be recognized that a facial reading of

§208 would seem to suggest that private remedial measures are
subject to the same provisions for exceptions.

However, if one

considers that the private remedial measures were enacted

8™
subsequent to the original Act, doubt ,1s created as to
whether it was the intent of the Legislature to reach that result.
Considering the purpose of the original exceptions and the
purpose of the subsequent creation of private remedial rights,
the Court must construe those enactments so as to carry out the
legislative intent and not nullify the purpose of this legislation.
In Waddell v, Briggs,

Me., 381 A.2d 1132 (1978), the following

observations were made with regard to statutory construction.
’’When it is clear that the Legislature
enacted specific legislation to remedy an
existing special problem, social or other
wise, such statutory enactment must be
construed so as to promote the policy
consideration which brought about the
Legislature's action .... Such construction
shall be adopted as will best curb the
pi"ob1em which the Legislature sought to
suppress.1'
Based upon the foregoing the Court concludes that §200(2)
does not apply to actions asserting private rights.

Although

the AG and Ford have raised many other issues in support
of their respective positions, it in the Court's view that
resolution of the matters presented at oral argument encompass
these other issues.

This Court finds that Ford is not exempt

from prosecution under the UTPA pursuant to Section 208(2).
Accordingly, the entry shall be;
Defendant's motions to dismiss be and
hereby are DENIED.

Dated;

January 21, 1981
Justice, Superior Court

STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT
Civil Action
Docket No •(*7^ —

KENNEBEC , SS.

STATE OF MAINE, ex rel.
RICHARD S. COHEN, Attorney
General, in his Official
Capacity
Plaintiff
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
A Delaware Corporation,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMPLAINT FOR
PERMANENT INJUNCTION,
RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES

The State of Maine, by and through Richard S. Cohen,
Attorney General of the State of Maine, herein alleges:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This action is brought in the public interest, pursuant to
4 M.R.S.A. §105 and 5 M.R.S.A. §209, commonly known as the
Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.

2.

Venue is laid in Kennebec County, pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A.
§209

3.

Defendant Ford Motor Company (hereinafter "Ford") is a
Delaware corporation with its principal office and place of
business located at The American Road, Dearborn, Michigan.
At all times mentioned herein, Ford manufactured motor
vehicles and sold them in Maine through various authorized
dealers.

Co^

COUNT ONE
4.

During the 1978 model year, Ford manufactured and sold in
Maine motor vehicles which developed excessive camshaft and
rocker arm wear.

This camshaft and rocker arm wear was

proximately caused, inter alia, by defective valve train
design, insufficient hardness of components, and inadequate
lubrication resulting from Ford's specification of the
improper engine lubricant in its owners manuals accompanying
said motor vehciles.
5.

Excessive camshaft and rocker arm wear developed in several
engines manufactured, and sold in Maine including, but not
limited to, the 4-cylinder 2.0 and 2.3 liter engines.

6.

Upon information and belief, a substantial number of motor
vehicles manufactured by Ford which developed the conditions
described above in paragraph 4 and 5 had been sold by Ford's
authorised dealers in Maine.

7.

■*

At various times Ford initiated "extended policy programs,"
implemented by its authorized dealers acting as Ford's agents,
to compensate purchasers of Ford or otherwise make whole
motor vehicles which developed the conditions described in
this Complaint.

8.

In many instances, Ford has failed to compensate or to otherwise make whole purchasers under its extended policy program
described in paragraph 7.

In such instances, purchasers are

not compensated because, inter .alia, they are not aware of
Ford's programs, because of limitations upon the programs
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such as mileage and duration of ownership, because of
limitations placed upon compensation for incidental and
consequential damages, or because dealers do not abide by
the program.
9.

^

By virtue of 11 M.R.5.A. §§2-314 and 2-316, all motor vehicles
manufactured, and sold in Maine by Ford which were used or
bought primarily for use for personal, family, or household
purposes carried an implied warranty of merchantability.

10.

The presence of the design, component, and/or assembly defects
described in this Complaint in the motor vehicles manufactured,
and sold in Maine by Ford constitutes breach of the foregoing
statutory implied warranty of merchantability.

11.

Said breach of the implied warranty of merchantability proximately caused injury to consumer-purchasers of Ford's motor
vehicles in Maine.

12.

Ford's specification of the improper engine lubricarit in its
owner's manuals accompanying the 1978 model year motor vehicles
equipped with 2.0 or 2.3 liter engines, among others, and
manufactured, and sold in Maine by Ford constitutes breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability extended by Ford as to
those motor vehicles described in Paragraph

13.

9, supra.

Said breach of the implied warranty of merchantability proximately caused injury to consumer-purchasers of Ford's motor
vehicles in Maine.

14.

The consumer-purchasers of the motor vehicles concerning which
Ford was or is in breach of the implied warranty of merchant-
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ability, ¿is described in Paragraphs 10 and 12, supra, have
notified or will notify Ford1s authorized dealers of said
breach wiLhin a reasonable time after discovery of the breach
was made, or will be made, or should have beei^made or
should be made.
15.

Ford's failure to fully compensate or otherwise make whole
consumer-purchasers of the motor vehicles described in this
complaint, by its actions as described in Paragraphs 8, 10
and 12, supra, constitutes a failure to honor the implied
warranty of merchantability extended by Ford on said motor
vehicles by virtue of 11 M.R.S.A. §§ 2-314 and 2-316.

16.

Defendant's failure to honor its implied warranty of merchant
ability, as described in Paragraph 15, supra, is an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in violation of 11 M.R.S.A.
§ 2-316(5) (a) .

17.

Defendant's failure to honor its implied warranty of merchant
ability, as described in Paragraph 15, supra, is an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
COUNT TWO

18.

Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 and
incorporates them herein by reference.

19.

&
Ford's specifications of the improper engine lubricant in its
owner's manuals accompanying the 1978 model year motor vehicles
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equipped with 2.0 or 2.3 liter engines, among others, manu
factured , and sold by Ford in Maine constitutes an act of
negligent misrepresentation in breach of its duty of care
owed to purchasers of its motor vehi fes to specify to them,in its owner's manuals, the proper means of servicing and
maintaining their motor vehicles.
20.

Said breach of Ford's duty of care proximately caused injury
to purchasers of its motor vehicles in Maine.

21.

The failure of Ford to fully compensate or otherwise make
whole purchasers of motor vehicles to whom it owed the duty
of care described in Paragraphs 19 and 20, supra, constitutes
a failure to honor said duty of care.

22.

Defendant1s failure to honor its duty of care described in
Paragraphs 19 and 20, supra, is an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. §207.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Honorable Court:

I.

Declare that:
A.

The presence of the design, component, and/or assembly
defects described in this Complaint in the motor vehicles
manufactured, and sold in Maine by Ford constitutes breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability extended by
Ford pursuant to 11 M.R.S.A. §§2-314 and 2-316.

B.

Ford's specification of the improper engine lubricant in
its owner's manuals accompanying the 1978 model year

motor vehicles equipped with 2.0 or 2.3 liter engines,
among others, and manufactured, and sold in Maine by Ford
constitutes breach of the implied warranty of merchant
ability extended by Ford pursuant to 11 M.R.S.A. §§2-314
and 2-316.
C.

Ford's specification of the improper engine lubricant in
its owner's manuals accompanying the 1973 model year
v

motor vehicles equipped with 2.0 and 2.3 liter engines,
among others, manufactured, and sold by Ford, in Maine
constitutes an act of negligent misrepresentation in breach
of its duty of care owed to purchasers of its motor vehicles
to specify to them, in its owner's manuals, the proper
means of servicing and maintaining their motor vehicles.

D.

Ford's failure to honor its implied warranty of merchant
ability, extended by Ford on the motor vehicles it manu
factured, and sold in Maine is an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in violation of 11 M.R.S.A. §2-316(5)(A).

E.

Ford's failure to honor its implied warranty of merchant
ability, extended by Ford on the motor vehicles it manu
factured, and sold in Maine is an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. §207..

F.

Ford's failure to honor its duty of care to specify, in
*
its owner's manuals, the proper means of servicing and
maintaining the motor vehicles it manufactured, and sold
in Maine is an unfair or deceptive act or practice in
violation of 5 M.R.S.A. §207.

-6-

*11.

Permanently enjoining Ford from failing to honor the implied
warranty of merchantability extended by Ford pursuant to
11 M.R.S.A. §§2-314 and 2-316.

HI.

Order the restoration of monies and payment of damages by
Ford to purchasers of motor vehicles, manufactured, and sold
in Maine which contained or contain the defects and/or
improper owner's manuals described in this Complaint, for the
following expenses, costs, and/or damages, inter alia,
incurred by said purchasers.
A.

Repair of the defect and incidental and consequential
expenses associated therewith; and/or

B.

Damages for Ford's breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability and for Ford's breach of the duty of
care to specify the proper means of servicing and
maintaining its motor vehicles; and/or

C.

Incidental and/or consequential damages resulting from
Ford's breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
and from Ford's breach of the duty of care to specify the
proper means of servicing and maintaining its motor
vehicles; and/or

D.

Depreciation in the value of said motor vehicles from
the aforesaid breach of implied warranties and breach
of the duty of care.

*

The total monetary relief sought will be determined after
discovery of Ford’s books and records and other pretrial proceedings.
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IV.

Grant Plaintiff its cost of investigation of Ford and its
cost of suit, including attorney *s fees, pursuant to 5
M.R.S.A. §209.

r

V .

Grant such other equitable relief as the Court deems proper

Dated:

12/7/79

Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD S. COHEN
Attorney General
State of Maine

.40

u)crvhA

HN w. Mc Ca r t h y
Assistant Attorney General
Department of the Attorney General
State House
Augusta, Maine
04333
289-3076

»
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STATE OP MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT

KENNEBEC, SS.

CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OP MAINE, ex rel.
RICHARD S. COHEN, Attorney
General, in his Official
Capacity and on behalf of
DANIEL E. PATTERSON and all
Maine Consumers similarly
situated,
Plaintiff
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
A Delaware Corporation,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMPLAINT FOR PERMANENT
INJUNCTION, RESTITUTION
AND DAMAGES

The State of Maine, by and through Richard S. Cohen, Attorney
General of the State of Maine, herein alleges:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This action is brought in the public Interest, pursuant to
4 M.R.S.A. §105 and 5 M.R.S.A. §209> commonly known as the
Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.

*

Venue is laid in Kennebec County, pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A.
§209.

PARTIES
3.

Defendant Ford Motor Company (hereinafter "Ford") is a
Delaware corporation with its principal office and place
of business located at The American Road, Dearborn,
Michigan,

At all times mentioned herein, Ford manufactured

motor vehicles, and sold them in Maine through various
authorized dealers.
4.

Daniel E. Patterson is a Maine citizen residing at 231
West Broadway, Bangor, Maine.

He is the owner of a 1975

Pinto Station Wagon which developed the piston-scuffing
and camshaft wear conditions described in this Complaint,

COUNT ONE
5.

During the 1974 through 1977 model years, Ford manufactured,
and sold in Maine motor vehicles which developed a "pistonscuffing" condition.

Piston-scuffing is metal to metal

contact between the pistons and the cylinder walls of an
internal combustion engine and was proximately caused by
inadequate lubrication resulting, inter alia, from a design
defect in which connecting rods and bearings were designed
without oil squirtholes.
6.

Piston-scuffing developed in several engines manufactured,
and sold in Maine by Ford including, but not limited to,
the 4-cylinder, 2.3 liter engine and the 6-cylinaer, 200
and 250 cubic inch engines.

■n

7.

During the 1974 through 1978 model years, Ford manufactured,
and sold in Maine motor vehicles which developed excessive
camshaft and rocker arm wear.

This camshaft and rocker arm

wear was proximately caused, inter alia, by defective valve
train design, insufficient hardness of components, and
inadequate lubrication resulting from Ford's specification
of the improper engine lubricant in its owner's manuals
accompanying said motor vehicles.
8.

Excessive camshaft and rocker arm wear developed in several
engines manufactured, and sold in Maine by Ford including,
but not limited to, the 4-cylinder, 2.0 and 2.3 liter
engines.

9.

During the 1974 through 1977 model years, Ford manufactured,
and sold in Maine motor vehicles which developed cracks in
the engine block.

Such cracked engine blocks were proximately

caused, inter alia, by a stress riser resulting from a raised
bead of sand in the water jacket's core during engine casting.
10.

Cracked engine blocks, developed in several engines manufactured,
and sold in Maine by Ford including, but not limited to, the
400-W cubic inch (Windsor) and the 351-M and 400-C cubic inch
(Cleveland) engines.

11.

During the 1974, 1976, and 1977 model years. Ford manufactured,
and sold in Maine motor vehicles which developed a "piston
slapping" condition.

Piston-slapping is metal to metal con

tact between the pistons and the cylinder walls of an internal
combustion engine and was proximately caused by defective

n

engine design, component manufacture, and/or engine assembly
resulting in excessive side clearance between the pistons and
cylinder walls.
12.

Piston-slapping developed in several engines manufactured, and
sold in Maine by Ford including, but not limited to, the 4cylinder, 2.3 liter engine and the 6-cylinder, 300 cubic
inch engine.

13.

During the 1974 through 1976 model years, Ford manufactured,
and sold in Maine motor vehicles which developed malfunc
tioning conditions involving the cylinder block, cylinder
head, connecting rods and bearings, pistons and piston rings,
crankshaft, intake manifold and valves.

Such conditions

were proximately caused by engine defects which were latent
at the time of Ford’s manufacture and sale of the motor
vehicles in Maine.
14.

The various defective engine conditions enumerated in
Paragraph 13 developed in several engines manufactured, and
sold in Maine by Ford including, but not limited to, the
360/390 FE light truck engines.

15.

Upon information and belief, a substantial number of motor
vehicles manufactured by Ford which developed the conditions
described above in Paragraphs 5-14 have been sold by Ford’s
authorised dealers in Maine, .

16.

At various times, including during 19773 Ford initiated 1,ex~
tended policy programs.

implemented by its authorized

dealers acting as Ford's agents, to compensate purchasers
of Ford motor vehicles which developed the conditions
described in this Complaint and/or to repair such vehicles.
17.

In many instances, Ford has failed to compensate or to other
wise make whole purchasers under its extended policy programs
described in Paragraph 1 6 .

In such instances, purchasers are

not compensated because, inter alia, they are not aware of
Ford's programs, because of limitations upon the programs
such as mileage or duration of ownership, because of limita
tions placed upon compensation for incidental and consequential
damages, or because dealers do not abide by the program.
18.

By virtue of 11 M.R.S.A. §§2-31^ and 2-316* all motor vehicles
manufactured, and sold in Maine by Ford which were used or
bought primarily for use for personal., family, or household
purposes carried an implied warranty of merchantability.

19.

The presence of the design, component, and/or assembly defects
described In this Complaint in the motor vehicles manufactured,
and sold In Maine by Ford constitutes breach of the foregoing
statutory implied warranty of merchantability.

20.

Said breach of the implied warranty of merchantability proximately caused injury to consumer-purchasers of Ford's motor
vehicles In Maine.

21.

Ford's specification of the improper engine lubricant in Its
owner's manuals accompanying the 197^ through 1973 model
year motor vehicles equipped with 2.0 or 2.3 liter engines,

-
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among others, and manufactured, and sold in Maine by
Ford constitutes breach of the implied warranty of mer
chantability extended by Ford as to those motor vehicles
described in Paragraph 1 8 , supra.
22.

Said breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
proximately caused injury to consumer-purchasers of Ford’s
motor vehicles in Maine.

23.

The consumer-purchasers of the motor vehicles concerning
which Ford was or is in breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, as described in Paragraphs 19 and 21,
supra, have notified or will notify Ford’s authorized
dealers of said breach within a reasonable time after
discovery of the breach was made, or will be made, or
should have been made or should be made.

24.

Ford’s failure to fully compensate or otherwise make whole
consumer-purchasers of motor vehicles concerning Ford
which was or is in breach of the implied warranty of mer
chantability, as described in Paragraphs 19 and 21, supra,
constitutes a failure to honor the implied warranty of
merchantability extended by Ford on said motor vehicles by
virtue of 11 M.H.S.A. §§2-314 and 2-316.

23,

Defendant’s failure to honor

s

imp lied

warrant^ of r.sv-

chantability, as described in Paragraph 24, supra, is an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of 11
M.R.S.A. §2-316(5)(a).
:6.

Defendant’s failure to honor its implied warranty of mer
chantability, as aescr ged in Paragraph 24, supra

is an

unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of 5
M.R.S.A. §207.

COUNT TWO
27.

Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1* 2* 3, 1, 8* 15, 16* and
17 and incorporates them herein by reference.

28.

Ford's specifications of the improper engine lubricant in
its owner's manuals accompanying the 197^ through 1978
model year motor vehicles equipped with 2.0 or 2.3 liter
engines* among others* manufactured* and sold by Ford in
Maine constitutes an act of negligent misrepresentation in
breach of its duty of care owed to purchasers of its motor
vehicles to specify to them* in its owner's manuals, the
proper means of servicing and maintaining their motor
vehicles.

29.

Said breach of Ford's duty of care proximately caused injury
to purchasers of its motor vehicles in Maine.

30.

The failure of Ford to fully compensate or otherwise make
whole purchasers of motor vehicles to whom it owed the duty
of care described in Paragraphs 28 and 29, supra * constitutes
a failure to honor said duty of care.

31.

Defendant’s failure to honor its duty of care described in
Paragraphs 28 ana 29, supra* is an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. §207.

COUNT THREE
PLAINTIFF CLASS ALLEGATIONS
32.

Plaintiff realleges Paragraphs 1 through 23 and 28 through
29 and incorporates them herein by reference.

33.

Plaintiff, State of Maine, acting through its Attorney
General brings this count in the form of a class action,
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure
on behalf of Daniel E. Patterson and a class of persons,
similarly situated, suffering loss, who purchased motor
vehicles manufactured, and sold In Maine by Ford during
the 1974 through 1978 model years, which motor vehicles
developed the conditions described in Paragraphs 5-14,
supra.

The number of class members is presently unknown.

However, upon Information and belief, the class is so
numerous that joinder Is impractical.
34.

The State of Maine and Daniel E. Patterson, acting through
the Attorney General, will fairly insure the adequate
representation of the interests of the class.

The Interests

of the State of Maine and Daniel E. Patterson are coincident
with, and not antagonistic to, those of the class members.
35.

There are questions of fact and law common to the class,
including, cut not limited to:
A.

Whether motor vehicles manufactured, and sold in Maine
to purchasers developed the conditions alleged in this
Complaint;

B.

Whether said conditions were proximately caused as
alleged in this Complaint;

C.

Whether Ford extended an implied warranty of mer
chantability on the motor vehicles sold to consumerpurchasers 3 as alleged in this Complaint;

D.

Whether Ford owed a duty of care to purchasers to
specify, in its owner’s manuals, the proper means
of servicing and maintaining their motor vehicles,
as alleged in this Complaint;

E.

Whether the presence of the design, component, and/or
assembly defects, described in this Complaint, in the
motor vehicles manufactured, and sold in Maine by
Ford constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability provided by 11 M.R.S.A. §§2-31^ and
2-316, as alleged in this Complaint;

F.

Whether Ford’s specification of the improper engine
lubricant in its owner’s manuals accompanying the
1 9 7 ^ through 1978 model year motor vehicles equipped

with 2.0 or 2.3 liter engines, among others, and
manufactured, and sold in Maine by Ford constitutes
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
provided by 11 M.R.S.A. §§2-31^ and 2-316, as alleged
in this Complaint.
G.

Whether Ford's specification of the improper engine
lubricant in its owner’s manuals, as stated in Para
graph 35(F), supra, constitutes breach of Ford’s duty
of care, as stated in Paragraph 35(0) supra.

-
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36.

The prosecution of separate actions by the class members
would create a risk of adjudications that might as a
practical matter dispose of the interests of nonparty
members of the class or impede their ability to protect
such interest.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Honorable Court:
I.

Declare that:
A.

The presence of the design, component, and/or assembly
defects described in this Complaint in the motor vehicles
manufactured, and sold in Maine

by Ford constitutes

breach of the implied warranty of merchantability ex
tended by Ford pursuant to 11 M.R.S.A. §§2-314 and 2-316.
B.

Ford's specification of the improper engine lubricant
In its owner's manuals accompanying the 1974 through 1978
model year motor vehicles equipped with 2.0 or 2.3 liter
engines, among others, and manufactured, and sold in
Maine

by Ford constitutes breach of the implied warranty

of merchantability extended by Ford pursuant to 11 M.R.S.A.
§§2-314 and 2-316.
C.

Ford's specification of the improper engine lubricant in
Its owner's manuals accompanying the 1974 through 1978
model year motor vehicles equipped with 2.0 or 2.3 liter
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engines, among others, manufactured, and sold by Ford,
in Maine constitutes an act of negligent misrepresentation
in breach of its duty of care owed to purchasers of its
motor vehicles to specify to them, in its owner's manuals,
the proper means of servicing and maintaining their motor
vehicles.
D.

Ford's failure to honor its implied warranty of
merchantability, extended by Ford on the motor
vehicles it manufactured, and sold in Maine is an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation
of 11 M.R.S.A. §2-316(5)(A).

E.

Ford's failure to honor its implied warranty of mer
chantability, extended by Ford on the motor vehicles
it manufactured, and sold in Maine is an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in violation of 5 M.R.S.A.
§207.

F.

Ford's failure to honor its duty of care to specify,
in its owner's manuals, the proper means of servicing
and maintaining the motor vehicles it manufactured,
and sold in Maine is an unfair or deceptive act or
practice in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. §207.

Permanently enjoining Ford from failing to honor the implied
warranty of merchantability extended by Ford pursuant to
11 M.R.S.A. §§2-314 and 2-316.
Order the restoration of monies and payment of damages by
Ford to purchasers of motor vehicles, manufactured, and

sold in Maine which contained or contain the defects
and/or improper owner's manuals described in this
Complaint, for the following expenses, costs, and/or
damages, inter alia, incurred by said purchasers,
A.

Repair of the defect and incidental and consequential
expenses associated therewith; and/or

B.

Damages for Ford's breach of the implied ^^^arranty of
merchantability and for Ford's breach of the duty of
care to specify the proper means of servicing and
maintaining its motor vehicles; and/or

C.

Incidental and/or consequentail damages resulting
from Ford's breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability and from Ford's breach of the duty
of care to specify the proper means of servicing
and maintaining its motor vehicles; and/or

D.

Depreciation in the value of said motor vehicles
from the aforesaid breach of implied warranties
and breach of the duty of care.

The total monetary relief sought will be determined after
discovery of Ford's books and records and other pretrial
proceedings.

V,

Grant Plainti.

;s cost of investi

.on o: fora ana its

cost of suit, including attorney's fees, pursuant to p

M.R.S.A. §209.

V.

Grant such other equitable relief as the Court deems proper.

DATED:

July 19, 1979

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD S. COHEN
Attorney General
State of Maine ...

STANLEY GREENBERG
Assistant Attorney’ renerai
Consumer & Antitrust Division
Department of the Attorney General
State House
Augusta, ME 04333
289-3716

